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Abstract
Background: This paper reports the process and outcome of a consensus finding project, which began with a meeting
at the Brocher Foundation in May 2015. The project sought to generate and reach consensus on standards of practice
for Empirical Bioethics research. The project involved 16 academics from 5 different European Countries, with a range of
disciplinary backgrounds.
Methods: The consensus process used a modified Delphi approach.
Results: Consensus was reached on 15 standards of practice, organised into 6 domains of research practice
(Aims, Questions, Integration, Conduct of Empirical Work, Conduct of Normative Work; Training & Expertise).
Conclusions: Through articulating these standards we outline a position that encourages responses, and through
those responses we will be able to identify points of agreement and contestation that will drive the conversation
forward. In that vein, we would encourage researchers, funders and journals to engage with what we have proposed,
and respond to us, so that our community of practice of empirical bioethics research can develop and evolve further.
Keywords: Empirical bioethics, Methods, Methodology, Standards, Consensus
Background
Empirical bioethics (EB) is a broad term that has been
used to capture a range of different research activities
[1]. This paper focusses on a particular approach that
has been taken in predominantly European literature
that frames empirical bioethics as an interdisciplinary
activity in which empirical social scientific analysis is
integrated with ethical analysis in order to draw norma-
tive conclusions. It is exciting, according to Ives et al.
[1], because it is a field that potentially “promises a great
deal”, but also frustrating “because the emerging field
threatens to be so multifarious and vague that making
sense of it is a challenge for even the most seasoned
researcher” (ix). Much ink has been spilled in recent
years either extolling or critiquing the rise of the ‘empir-
ical turn’ in bioethics [1–3]. Whilst some commentators
debate whether or not EB is a good or necessary thing [4,
5] others have articulated methods and methodologies for
conducting empirical bioethics research and used them
[6–20].
The challenges of this endeavor are by now
well-known and well-rehearsed, and centre on: onto-
logical1 and epistemological2 questions connected to
how an empirical ‘is’ can inform a normative ‘ought’
claim; on disciplinary questions about the nature and
core characteristics of the field itself; and on methodo-
logical questions regarding how to integrate the empir-
ical and the normative part of EB. These challenges
notwithstanding, or perhaps just because they are so
contentious and difficult to overcome, numerous
approaches to conducting such work have been de-
scribed. In a recent systematic review, Davies et al. [21]
identified 32 distinct EB methodologies that try some-
how to ‘integrate’ the empirical and the normative. The
authors of that review also warned that due to the het-
erogeneity of approaches it is difficult to present, defend
or critically assess a piece of work in EB because:
‘The shortcuts that can be taken when explaining and
justifying work undertaken within clear disciplinary silos
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are not available to empirical bioethics. There is no
standard approach to cite, there is no accepted method-
ology or set of methods to fall back on, and the process
of offering justification for every methodological choice
from first principles takes a lot of space, which is rarely
available’. (p12).
Davies et al. went on to suggest that a way forward
may be to try to find some sort of consensus within the
academy on what constitutes good work of this kind:
One way forward may be to attempt to find some level
of consensus on what is required of an empirical bioeth-
ics methodology, and what standards we might use to
assess the quality of work proposed and/or undertaken
under this broad umbrella. Establishing a consensus that
outlines areas of agreement may be able to provide some
external and relatively concrete validation for at least
some kinds of work. Such areas of agreement might in-
clude, for example: what assumptions one may legitim-
ately make, and whether the theoretical assumptions
behind one’s approach need to be stated, explained or
fully justified (from first principles). (p12).
We believe that there are potential benefits from
attempting to find some level of consensus regarding
what EB is and what we conceive as a minimum meth-
odological quality.
A central benefit of having some agreement on what is
required of an EB study (in design, conduct and report-
ing) is that it is likely to help cement EB as a distinct
‘community of practice’ [22], with its own specific meth-
odological norms and aims. Such a community of prac-
tice may help those engaging with it to conduct EB and
to locate themselves in the academy. Having agreed and
accepted standards may also help the community of
practice to ensure and improve the quality of work, pro-
vide a springboard for future methodological develop-
ments, and be useful in training (PhD) researchers.
Those who plan EB can then pro-actively reflect upon
the design and quality of their research. Conversely, if
no consensus is possible, that might suggest that EB may
not be tenable as a community of practice.
Additional benefits of trying to establish standards of
practice include:
1) It is potentially beneficial to researchers seeking
funding, who may be able to point to areas of
agreement to support certain methodological
choices and decisions, or similarly to challenge
assertions about inappropriate methodological
choices that are in fact moot.
2) It is similarly useful for researchers seeking
publication to have a clear idea of what is expected
in terms of reporting, which can guide their writing.
3) It is likely to be beneficial to journals, funders, and
the peer reviewers they draw on, to be able to point
to an agreed set of practice standards for empirical
bioethics, which can be used to inform and guide
quality assessment.
4) It is likely to be beneficial for those who train or
teach students and researchers in the field of EB.
These benefits are particularly relevant in a field where
interdisciplinarity in some shape or form is ubiquitous,
and in which the challenges of answering an individual
research question might require deviations from stand-
ard disciplinary approaches. Early pioneers of this kind
of work recognized that standard approaches to data
collection, for example, may have to be altered in order
to generate data that could help them meet their par-
ticular aims, with focus groups being turned into some-
thing more interrogative and challenging - more ‘akin to
a philosophy seminar’ - than they might normally be.
[23] This kind of methodological innovation is to be
expected in a developing interdisciplinary field but, as
Frith and Draper [22] have pointed out, it presents chal-
lenges when engaging with a disciplinary audience,
which might tend to appraise the work according to its
own norms.
Given these potential benefits, the call for the develop-
ment of research practice standards in EB has already
begun to be answered. In an important recent contribu-
tion, members of the empirical ethics working group of
the Academy of Ethics in Medicine in Germany have
outlined what they describe as a “road map for quality
criteria” in empirical ethics research [24]. Motivated by
the same concerns about the broad variety of method-
ologies adopted within interdisciplinary inquiry of this
kind, these authors categorised quality criteria on the
basis of the i) primary research question, ii) theoretical
framework and methods, iii) relevance, iv) interdisciplin-
ary research practice, and v) research ethics and scien-
tific ethos. Drawing on quality criteria for empirical
research in the social sciences, and for philosophical
inquiry in practical ethics, they identified formal norms,
cognitive norms, and ethical norms that gave shape to
their ‘road map’ of basic criteria for good quality inter-
disciplinary empirical ethics research. Formal norms
refer to those practices associated with research writing;
cognitive norms to those practices associated with gen-
eral methodological commitments and the deployment
of appropriate forms of analysis; and ethical norms to
those practices associated with the moral conduct of the
research activities.
Mertz et al.’s [24] proposal is focused on adopting
standards drawn from other areas of inquiry to provoke
empirical ethics researchers to reflect carefully on the
choices they make in their studies. Whilst this road map
commits researchers to certain criteria, it is unclear – as
the authors themselves acknowledge – whether this
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starting point provides precise enough guidance to be
useful to the various audiences that we believe could
benefit from clarifications of this kind. It also looks to be
important to undertake this standard-development exer-
cise in ways that involve, and thus can command broad
agreement within, the varied communities of EB
researchers themselves.
Mindful of the risks involved in this kind of activity,
this paper reports an attempt to develop a consensus
amongst some European practitioners of EB about stan-
dards of practice and reporting in EB research. We take
the work of Mertz et al. as a starting point, and seek to
further develop this body of work by undertaking a
transparent and rigorous consensus seeking process,
utilizing the perspectives of a range of expert scholars
with different disciplinary expertise, purposively selected
to represent different and putatively opposing EB posi-
tions. We sought to generate, as far as possible, a set of
agreed standards that are precise enough to provide con-
crete guidance for (a) identifying the core characteristics
of EB (b) planning EB (c) conducting EB and (d) report-
ing EB. In what follows, we describe the process and the
consensus that was reached, and we discuss the implica-
tions that we see for the on-going development of a field
that is committed to these standards.
Methods and results
The lead authors of this paper (JI, MD, BM, JS) applied
for funding from the Brocher Foundation to hold a
2.5 day meeting (May 2015) in which an attempt would
be made to generate standards of practice and reach
consensus. We utilised an adapted Delphi process, which
is a recognised and well established technique for reach-
ing consensus and is amenable to modification to suit
specific aims [25]. The Delphi method, broadly speaking,
is a structured consensus finding process, which typically
involves administering questionnaires to expert partici-
pants in an iterative series of rounds. After each round,
feedback is provided to participants that summarizes
the views of the group, suggests a common position,
and then seeks further input. According to Hsu &
Sandford [26].
“The feedback process allows and encourages the
selected Delphi participants to reassess their initial judg-
ments about the information provided in previous itera-
tions. Thus, in a Delphi study, the results of previous
iterations regarding specific statements and/or items can
change or be modified by individual panel members in
later iterations based on their ability to review and assess
the comments and feedback provided by the other
Delphi panelists.” (p2).
Typically this process maintains the anonymity of par-
ticipants; the putative advantage of which is that it frees
participants from pressure to conform to the group view.
Our adaptation of this method differed in two important
ways. First we did not seek feedback through multiple
rounds of questionnaires, but through group discussion.
Second, and as a consequence of this, participants were
clearly identifiable to one another. This adaptation was
justified, we felt, by the pressing need to have clear and
robust direct verbal communication through discussion
that allowed disagreements to be aired and mutually
understood, and which facilitated a sense of the group
having a clearly defined and shared goal. Given the lin-
guistic and conceptual diversity of the field, and given
that the majority of the groups were working in a second
language, we felt it would be very problematic to use
questionnaires – which rely on an assumption of clarity
and shared understanding. Given that we could not take
shared language and conceptual understanding for
granted, we needed a process that allowed participants
to immediately respond and ask for clarification as and
when an ambiguous or controversial issue was raised.
Rather than having a series of iterative questionnaires,
we therefore had a series of iterative discussion groups,
with regular summary and feedback sessions (acting as a
‘member check’), in which we iteratively developed a set
of agreed ‘domains’ (categories of research activity in
which standards might be required), then standards
within those domains, and finally concrete formulations
of standards within those domains.
One potential weakness introduced by the discussion
group modification is that participants may have felt un-
able to challenge what they saw as the prevailing group
view. This is always a risk in any group process, but it
was mitigated in various ways. First, the round 1 process
(detailed below) in which standards were developed was
carried out in small groups, which changed on each
rotation, meaning that there was no single group view
that could dominate in the early stages. Second, the final
stage of the process was carried out via online voting
and feedback, and so all participants had the opportunity
to agree or disagree without being observed by the rest
of the group and risking being seen as ‘deviant’. Finally,
in our opinion, during the discussion sessions we saw no
indication that any participants were reluctant to speak
or felt unable to offer a dissenting opinion – quite the
opposite, in fact, with discussion at times becoming
quite heated. Overall, given the benefits of the modifica-
tion (as described above), and given the steps that were
taken to mitigate the potential risks, we are confident
that the process was robust.
We have chosen here to present the methods and re-
sults together in a single narrative, which allows us to
better, and more efficiently, articulate our thinking at
each stage. Whilst we present our process in some detail,
we feel that this is necessary in order to demonstrate
transparency and rigor. In presenting the process and
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results together we do risk some ambiguity about the
focus of the paper. We stress that our primary goal is to
present and discuss the results of our consensus, and the
detailed presentation of our method is a means to
achieving that.
Participant selection
Space and funding was available for up to 20 participants
at the meeting, limited to those residing in Europe. In
selecting participants to invite, a number of factors were
considered and had to be balanced. Key considerations
were: previous contributions to and standing in the field;
gender balance; avoiding over-representation of a single
country; ensuring ‘disciplinary’ diversity, ensuring diver-
sity of known ‘meta-ethical’3 and methodological posi-
tions. This level of diversity was sought to try to ensure
that we did not create an ‘echo chamber’ in which a
group of like-minded people could easily agree.
Achieving a balance within the imposed limits on
numbers meant that not everyone who has contributed
significantly to the field could be invited, and so we
opted for a mix of participants who could represent the
various kinds of interests that operate within the field. In
light of this, we make no claims to have achieved a uni-
versal consensus – hence our title of ‘towards a
consensus’.
Potential participants were contacted individually and
asked to participate, and if an invited participant could
not attend, we sought an alternative who would add
similar diversity to the group. No-one approached re-
fused to take part, but some were unable to attend the
consensus meeting and therefore could not take part in
the project. In total, and including the meeting orga-
nizers, 30 people were approached to participate.
Ultimately, the consensus group comprised 16 mem-
bers from 5 different countries (see Table 1).
As with any consensus process, the consensus that
is ultimately produced cannot be representative or
generalized, and is limited to the group within which
the consensus was reached. The fact that this group
was limited to European researchers immediately im-
plies that the consensus reached is a product of a
broadly European perspective. Further, this process
did not (and could not) include all European empir-
ical bioethics researchers, and so the consensus can-
not be considered to be speaking for all empirical
bioethics researchers in Europe.
Perhaps the most salient limitation imposed by the
participants selected is that the kind of empirical bioeth-
ics that has demanded the most attention in Europe is
more focused on the process of integrating the theoret-
ical and the empirical than elsewhere in the world. As
Ives et al. [1] note in the preface to their book.
“This focus on integration is significant because it de-
marcates our account of empirical bioethics from other
research strategies that are commonly included under
this term. We take it that there are a number of other
ways in which empirical research can be put to work in
bioethic. The empirical identification of ethical issues in
practice, the empirical substantiation of practical moral
arguments and the empirical evaluation of the imple-
mentation of ethical arguments/interventions into prac-
tice are commonly included in ‘broader church’
typologies of empirical bioethics” (px).
Table 1 Delphi members
Name (in alphabetical order) Country Disciplinary orientation
Bærøe, Kristine Norway Bioethics; Philosophy
De Vries, Martine Netherlands Bioethics; Medicine
Dunn, Michael (Chair) United Kingdom Bioethics; Social Science
Frith, Lucy United Kingdom Bioethics; Social Science; Philosophy
Huxtable, Richard United Kingdom Medical law; Bioethics
Ives, Jonathan (Chair) United Kingdom Bioethics; Philosophy; Social Science
Landeweer, Elleke Netherlands/Norway Bioethics; Philosophy; Social Science
Mertz, Marcel Germany Philosophy; Social Science; Bioethics
Molewijk, Bert (Chair) Netherlands/Norway Clinical ethics; Social Science
Provoost, Veerle Belgium Bioethics; Social Science; Methodology
Rid, Annette United Kingdom Medicine; Philosophy; Bioethics
Salloch, Sabine Germany Medicine; Philosophy; Bioethics
Schildmann, Jan (Chair) Germany Medicine; Philosophy; Bioethics
Sheehan, Mark United Kingdom Bioethics; Philosophy
Strech, Daniel Germany Bioethics; Health Policy Analysis; Meta-Research
Widdershoven, Guy Netherlands Bioethics; Philosophy; Social Science
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Of course, it would be a mistake to assume that
there is a single European perspective, and our selec-
tion strategy (as outlined above) sought to select for
diversity in perspectives. Whilst all were able to agree
at the outset that the focus of the consensus would
be on an empirical bioethics that integrates the em-
pirical and the normative, there was still a great deal
of diversity within the group, which is demonstrated
in the results and discussion below.
Pre-meeting consultation via email
The first stage was a pre-meeting consultation process,
in which the aims and scope of the meeting were made
clear by the four organizers (JI, MD, BM, and JS). Partic-
ipants were asked by email to consider, as a starting
point, a prepared list of suggested domains under which
standards might be needed and some associated ques-
tions. These domains were identified by the lead authors
through a non-systematic review of the empirical bioeth-
ics literature. The instruction to participants was as
follows:
This pre-workshop exercise is intended to begin to
map out the ‘domains’ under which agreed standards
may be possible/required, and will be used as the
starting point for the workshop on the 11th May. On
the first day of the workshop, we will refine these
‘domains’ and limit further discussion to a smaller
sub-sample that we identify, as a group, as being the
most significant.
We have designed the workshop in this way due to the
wide range of research strategies adopted in the field,
which may presume a range of different and mutually
exclusive kinds of theoretical and methodological
commitments. We seek to explore how standards and
quality may be assessed, rather than how the research
ought to be done.
In order to make progress in the workshop on research
standards, we intend to limit discussions to focus on a
particular account of empirical bioethics. This is the
account that we adopted to obtain funding for the
meeting and, we hope, is minimal enough to be
accepted by all those attending the workshop:
“empirical bioethics is an approach to bioethics in
which empirical social scientific analysis is
integrated with ethical analysis in order to draw
normative conclusions.”
Participants were then asked to begin to think
about, and send comments on, the kind of topics and
questions we anticipated engaging with. This was
intended not to direct the content of such statements,
but to collect a broad range of various topics and
questions that might be relevant for the standards we
wanted to develop and to encourage participants to
begin to think about the nature and form of what we
might seek consensus on. The list of 11 domains and
questions/topics that was sent to participants is pre-
sented in Table 2 below.
Participants were asked to send feedback on the
following questions:
1) Are any domains missing? If so, which?
2) Should any domains be removed? If so, why?
3) Are any of the domains listed problematic or very
complexes? If so, why?
4) Can you think of any important example questions/
topics to add under any domain?
Table 2 List of domains and sample questions for the pre-meeting exercise
Domain Example question/topic
Aims What are appropriate aims for EB research?
Questions What kinds of questions can and should EB research answer?
Research ethics What distinctive ethical considerations should be foregrounded in the conduct of empirical bioethics
research?
Researcher characteristics/background What kinds of researchers ought (not) to be undertaking EB research?
Researcher training What kinds of trainings/skills/experience ought an EB researcher to have?
Nature of research team Can/should EB research be practiced by a research team or by an individual, or by either?
Methodology How precisely should social scientific and ethical inquiry be integrated in order to draw normative
conclusions?
Methods What are legitimate methods to use in EB research?
Nature/scope of normative
justification
What level of justification/support/ explication of normative argument are required in EB research?
Conclusions What kinds of conclusions are appropriate for EB research?
Publishing How should methodological approaches and methods be documented in papers submitted for academic
publication?
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The 2.5 day meeting
Item generation
Following a brief introductory talk from the organizers
at the start of the 2.5 day meeting, which reinforced the
aims (i.e. reaching consensus) and set some ground rules
(e.g. mutual respect, agreement to focus on reaching
consensus), the feedback from the pre-meeting consult-
ation was presented, as raw data. This was done with the
aim of orienting the group to the kinds of concerns and
issues likely to come up, and with a view to helping
everyone start to think about the topic and get a sense
of how their colleagues were thinking.
What then followed was a series of 6 rounds that
developed and sought agreement on ‘domains’ and ‘stan-
dards’. Domains were defined as ‘organizational categor-
ies that encapsulate a specific and meaningful part of the
research process’ and standards were defined as ‘pre-
scriptive statements about the conduct of work within a
domain’.
Round 1 (day 1) – Identifying domains The aim of
this round was to look specifically at all the domains
that had been proposed in the pre-meeting consultation
and propose changes (i.e. add or delete domains, re-
define domains, etc.). Participants were randomly split
into four groups, facilitated by one of the meeting chairs
(JI, MD, BM, JS), and each group considered all the do-
mains. After this round, each group came up with their
own list of all relevant domains under which standards
were thought to be required.
Round 2 (day 1) – Agreeing domains The four groups
were then recombined, and a member of each of the
four groups presented the domains developed during
their discussions, highlighting areas of agreement, dis-
agreement and uncertainty within their group. All
domains were recorded, and the meeting chairs began to
group similar domains together as they were presented,
making note of areas of similarity and disagreement be-
tween the different groups’ lists. Some domains were
clearly endorsed by all groups, and a discussion about
nomenclature was held to agree on the correct terms to
use. Discussions were also held about whether certain
domains were the same and needed combining, or were
in fact distinct. By the end of round 2, there was a list of
10 domains (see Table 3 below).
Round 3 (day 2) – Identifying domain standards Par-
ticipants were again randomly split across 4 four discus-
sion stations, each facilitated by one of the meeting
chairs (JI, MD, BM, JS). Each station was allocated a
number of the previously agreed domains, the number
being determined by the anticipated complexity of iden-
tifying standards for it.
Each station worked for 30 min, and then the groups
were split and participants were rotated into another sta-
tion whilst the facilitator remained. Each participant was
rotated into each station, working with different people
for 30 min, before returning to their original station for
the final rotation. Each proceeding group at each station
worked on and developed the work of the preceding
group, with the facilitator remaining throughout to ex-
plain the reasoning behind the previous group’s deci-
sions and ensure that the process and decisions were
recorded so that they could be presented back to the
wider group. Each group working at each station identi-
fied and revised standards for each domain they were
working with, which included both principled discus-
sions about what standards, should be used and how
each standard ought to be articulated. At the end of this
round, each domain had a set of draft standards, which
had been co-developed by all participants over the
course of 2.5 h.
Round 4 (day 2) – Ranking and formulating domain
standards in small groups The aim of this round was
to spend time revising and developing clear and precise
articulations of each draft standard. Participants were
given a choice about which domain they had most inter-
est in or felt they had most to contribute to, and they
naturally split themselves into equal size groups based
on interest. Each group spent 2 h talking through all
standards under each domain, and working on the pre-
cise formulation of each. Groups were told they could
decide to reject a standard if they felt it was not possible
to agree on a sufficiently specific form of words. Another
reason for rejecting a standard, or a whole domain, at
this stage was if the group felt that it was not sufficiently
useful or fit for purpose.
Round 5 (day 2–3) - ranking and formulating domain
standards in a large group After a break, the whole
group was reconvened, and each facilitator took the
group through each standard’s formulation and





4 Conduct of empirical work
5 Conduct of normative work
6 Training
7 Output
8 Research ethics and integrity
9 Multi−/inter-disciplinarity
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explained the reasons for the proposed wording. Each
individual standard was then debated, allowing as much
time as necessary to either achieve an uncontested for-
mulation or to be certain that more work was needed.
Given this, the planned timetable was adjusted, and it
was agreed that round 5 would continue into the final
day, and the consensus vote would take place
post-meeting. By the end of the 3rd day, there were pro-
posals to reject some domains entirely, and there were
still some standards that all agreed were required but for
which no wording had been proposed that could be put
to the vote.
At this point, it was agreed by the whole group that
the meeting organizers would take all comments that
had been made (and recorded in notes) and use those to
propose a set of domains, standards and formulations
that reflected the work done so far and which tried to
take into account as many of the points and concerns
raised as possible. These would then be circulated
post-meeting and voted on, with further refinements
made as needed according to a standard Delphi method.
It was also proposed and unanimously agreed at this
point that for consensus to be reached at least 80% of
participants must endorse a standard. For a group of 16,
this meant that 13 people had to endorse a standard in
order to reach consensus.
Post-meeting online rounds
Round 6a (post meeting) – First vote on domains and
standards
Post-meeting, the organizers developed a set of do-
mains and standards that seemed to best reflect the
plenary group discussions, and circulated these in an
online survey to the meeting participants. Table 4
presents the list of domains and standards that was
circulated, as well as the domains that were not in-
cluded and the reason (taken from the discussion in
round 5) for non-inclusion.
For each domain and standard, participants were given
the option of accepting the standard as it is, or rejecting
it and providing reasons for the rejection. Participants
were also invited to provide feedback on the domains
and standards as a whole and had the opportunity to
disagree with the list of domains (which had changed
from the original round 2 list as a result of the round 5
discussion).
At the end of round 6b, all standards but 1 (standard
12, which required ‘explicit and robust ethical argu-
ment’) had reached 80% consensus (see Table 5).
Round 6b (post meeting) – Reformulation and second vote
on standards.
In round 6b, the one outstanding standard was reworded
by the meeting organizers to accommodate the feedback,
and re-circulated in an online survey, with a covering
letter containing all the feedback received on that stand-
ard and a rationale for the re-formulation. This
re-formulation reached consensus (see Table 5).
In the remainder of this paper, we will focus on outlin-
ing and explaining each domain and standard that was
agreed upon, based on the discussions participants had.
We will also highlight areas that remain controversial
despite consensus having been reached.
Domain 1 - Aims
1) Empirical bioethics research should address a
normative issue that is oriented towards practice
(94% consensus)
The 94% consensus masks important conceptual
clarification work undertaken in the consensus-building
activities about the precise meaning of this standard. It
was ultimately recognized that ‘a normative issue’ cap-
tures a point of ethical uncertainty and/or disagree-
ment, concerning either a normatively defensible
course of action or the normatively defensible use of a
concept in practice. Thus, it was decided that a norma-
tive issue that aims to be settled in EB enquiry covers
ethical uncertainty in two main areas:
i) When, in any given situation, it is uncertain
whether course of action X or course of action Y
ought to be pursued. For example, in obstetrics
practice, whether doctors with religious views
inconsistent with terminating pregnancies should
be allowed to opt out of undertaking termination
of pregnancy, or not.
ii) When, in any given situation, it is uncertain
whether a concept relevant to an ethically
defensible action should be understood in terms
X or in terms Y. For example, in the context of
dementia care, whether the concept of ‘respect
for persons’ ought to be understood to
foreground respect for a person’s expressed
wishes as set down in advance (prior to the
onset of dementia), or respect for their apparent
wishes now.
Equally, much discussion took place about the precise
meaning of the term ‘oriented towards practice’. First, it
was recognized that the term ‘practice’ should be under-
stood in broad terms. In this sense, it would incorporate
practice as used in the traditional sense in bioethics to
describe real-world actions in the settings of health care
and biomedical research, but it would also include the
formulation of policy- or rule-making to determine the
form of real-world behaviours in these same areas.
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Table 4 List of domains and standards circulated (and rejected) following discussion in round 5
Domain Round 5 standards included Reason for rejection
Aims Empirical bioethics research should address a normative issue
that is oriented towards practice
N/A
Aims Empirical Bioethics research should integrate empirical methods
with ethical arguments in order to address this normative issue
N/A
Questions Empirical bioethics researchers ought to be explicit about how
the research question(s) asked address(es) the normative issue
identified in the aims
N/A
Integration The theoretical position on integration (i.e. the theoretical views
on how the empirical and the normative are related) should be
made clear and explicit
N/A
Integration The method of integration should be explained and justified,
including details of what is integrated with what, how and by
whom
N/A
Integration There should be transparency, consistency and rigor in the




Empirical bioethics research ought to attend to the rigorous
implementation of empirical methods, and import accepted




Empirical bioethics research should, if and where necessary,
develop and amend empirical methods to facilitate collection of
the data required to meet the aims of the research; but
deviation from accepted disciplinary standards and practices




Empirical bioethics research should reflect on and justify the
appropriateness and fit of the chosen empirical methods in





Empirical bioethics research should consider and reflect on the





In empirical bioethics research there should be thorough
delineation of the ethical issue(s), paying attention to, and




In empirical bioethics research there should be an explicit and
robust ethical argument, where argument is understood as an





The empirical bioethics researcher, or the research team as a
whole, should possess competence in ethical inquiry, empirical




The empirical bioethics researcher(s) should have at least a basic
knowledge of bioethics, and an understanding of whatever




Provision should be made for ensuring that any team members
can acquire or enhance competence in empirical bioethics
research
N/A
Conclusions None This was not included as a domain because formulations of
standards under it were (a) too prescriptive about the kind of
research that could be undertaken or (b) those that were not
too prescriptive simply repeated points already captured in
standards within the ‘aims’ and ‘questions’ domains.
Training None This was not included as a discrete domain but was combined
with the ‘multi/interdisciplinarity’ domain to create a more
apposite domain of ‘training and expertise’. It was felt that the
standards that could be created within both discrete domains
covered very similar material, and so combining appeared
sensible.
Output None This was not included as a domain because it was felt no
standards could be formulated for it that either (a) were not so
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Second, it was accepted that a defining feature of EB
research was its aim to be connected to the real world in
ways that can bring about ethically defensible changes to
practice (understood in the broad sense articulated
above). Notwithstanding this initial observation, partici-
pants also recognized that not each and every research
activity in an EB project will be directly practicable – i.e.
aiming to attempt to bring about such changes in the
world. Therefore, the concept of ‘orientation’ was
thought to best capture precisely how the practice focus
of EB research ought to be understood.
2) Empirical Bioethics research should integrate
empirical methods with ethical argument4 in order
to address this normative issue (81% consensus)
Disagreement in the early stages of consensus-building
focused on which research activities were ‘in’ and which
were ‘out’ of the gamut of EB research on account of
their aims (not) being formulated explicitly in terms of
addressing a normative issue through integrating empir-
ical and normative work. It was agreed that this kind of
standard was needed, and also that it would likely end
up being controversial, because it amounts to a
content-full criterion through which to determine
whether or not an activity counts as EB. It was agreed
that this standard needed to be formulated in broad
terms, with an expansive understanding of ‘integration’,
whilst simultaneously limiting empirical bioethics re-
search to those studies that sought to address a norma-
tive issue.
It was also understood by all participants that this
meant certain research activities would be excluded from
counting as EB – but that this was unavoidable. What
was important was ensuring that the standard was
formulated clearly enough to make explicit what kinds
of activities we are referring to, and therefore what kinds
of activity ought to be held to the standards that are be-
ing formulated. The kinds of research activities that
would be excluded based on this standard are:
i) Empirical research examining the form and nature
of how ethical issues arise in practical situations
(without any attempt to do more than characterize
or describe these issues).
ii) Empirical research evaluating the implementation
of interventions designed to bring about ethical
practice, when these interventions are taken to have
resolved all outstanding normative issues relating to
the practice in question (i.e. where the normative
issue underpinning the rationale for the
intervention is not itself taken to be at issue in
formulating the empirical research questions).
iii) Research drawing on empirical methods and ethical
analysis to examine abstract philosophical problems
that have no real-world correlates.
iv) Other empirical studies of moral behaviours or
judgements that are not aiming to address
normative ethical issues in practice.
Domain 2 – Questions
3) Empirical bioethics researchers ought to be explicit
about how the research question(s) asked address the
normative issue identified in the aims (88%
consensus)
There was relatively little disagreement about how the
standard relating to research questions was formulated,
despite the fact that this only achieved 88% consensus.
Table 4 List of domains and standards circulated (and rejected) following discussion in round 5 (Continued)
Domain Round 5 standards included Reason for rejection
general that they were not already covered by generally
accepted publishing standards or (b) were not too prescriptive
about the kinds of outputs that empirical bioethics should
aim for.
Research Ethics None This was not included as a domain because it was felt that the
standards that were proposed under it simply replicated
standards of practice that were already accepted and endorsed
widely, and therefore having specific standards around research
ethics for empirical bioethics was not needed.
Multi/
interdisciplinarity
None This was not included as a discrete domain but was combined
with the ‘training’ domain to create a more apposite domain
of ‘training and expertise’. It was felt that the standards that
could be created within both discrete domains covered very
similar material, and so combining appeared sensible. The label
was replaced with ‘expertise’ because it was considered overly
prescriptive to require multi/Interdisciplinarity’. Rather, what
was important is that all members of the team have
appropriate training and expertise – and this was dictated by
the research question and methods chosen.
Ives et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2018) 19:68 Page 9 of 20
Table 5 List of domains and standards and consensus reached during rounds 6a and 6b
Domain Round 6a standards %
(N = 16)
Round 6b standards %
(N = 16)
Aims 1. Empirical bioethics research should address a normative
issue that is oriented towards practice
94
(15/16)
Aims 2. Empirical Bioethics research should integrate empirical




Questions 3. Empirical bioethics researchers ought to be explicit
about how the research question(s) asked address the
normative issue identified in the aims
88
(14/16)
Integration 4. The theoretical position on integration
(i.e. the theoretical views on how the empirical




Integration 5. The method of integration should be explained and
justified, including details of what is integrated with
what, how and by whom.
94
(15/16)
Integration 6. There should be transparency, consistency and rigour in





7. Empirical bioethics research ought to attend to the
rigorous implementation of empirical methods, and






8. Empirical bioethics research should, if and where
necessary, develop and amend empirical methods to
facilitate collection of the data required to meet the
aims of the research; but deviation from accepted






9. Empirical bioethics research should reflect on and justify
the appropriateness and fit of the chosen empirical
methods in relation to (a) the normative aims and





10. Empirical bioethics research should consider and
reflect on the implicit ethical and epistemological





11. In empirical bioethics research there should be
thorough delineation of the ethical issue(s), paying






12. In empirical bioethics research there should be an
explicit and robust ethical argument, where argument
is understood as an explicit attempt to convince X to
adopt position Y with the use of reasons
75
(12/16)
In empirical bioethics research there should
be explicit and robust normative analysis.
‘Normative analysis’ includes attempts to
justify position X to person Y with the use
of ethical reasoning, providing suggestion
for improvement to position X based on
ethical reasoning, or attempts to break
down and make explicit a complex





13. The empirical bioethics researcher, or the research team as a
whole, should possess competence in ethical inquiry, empirical





14. The empirical bioethics researcher(s) should have at least a
basic knowledge of bioethics, and an understanding of whatever





15. Provision should be made for ensuring that any team
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Reflecting a widely recognized position in empirical re-
search, the view that specific research questions ought
to be connected directly to the overall aim of the re-
search activity was not thought to be controversial, nor
was it thought to be problematic to require researchers
to be explicit about this connection.
Disagreement here tracked disagreement in the formu-
lation of the second standard in the ‘aims’ domain,
where there was uncertainty about whether one or more
of these research questions would need to be formulated
in normative terms. As with the ‘aims’ standard above, it
was ultimately agreed that the research questions would
only meet the requisite standard for EB research if they
were formulated in such a way as to address the norma-
tive issue in ways that were oriented towards practice.
Thus, it would be expected that one or more research
questions would need to be a normative (ought) ques-
tion, and the connection to a particular field of practice
would need to be articulated within the normative
question.
Domain 3 – Integration
The three standards within the ‘integration’ domain refer
to the integration of empirical data5 and normative ana-
lysis, comprising some kind of normative reasoning
process in which the empirical data are included.
When working towards formulating these standards
there was discussion and disagreement about the mean-
ing of ‘integration’ and what the concept implies. Some
felt that integration does not have to mean that the em-
pirical and the normative are integrated into one kind of
knowledge entity, and that empirical data and normative
reasoning remain separate and essentially different
entities with empirical data supporting empirical prem-
ises in normative argument. Others had a different per-
spective, feeling that the requirement to engage with the
concept of integration was the construct of an artificial
philosophical separation, and that the empirical and the
normative are already inseparably entangled. Some felt
that all ‘integration’ can really mean is that empirical
data are used to help reach normative goals, whereas
others felt that empirical data itself has normative status
independent of any argument.
The shared agreement was that standards in this
domain should not be prescriptive about what integra-
tion means, but should focus on ensuring that formal
criteria of transparency and justification are met. Partici-
pants acknowledged that transparency requires articula-
tion of the meta-ethical and epistemological basis of
one’s position on integration, but also that there can be
reasonable disagreement on this issue; importantly, that
the appropriateness of any position on integration has to
be assessed in the context of the aims of the research.
Given this, participants felt it was essential that EB
researchers clarify how they think about integration and
how they undertake it, justifying their chosen approach
in relation to the aims of the research.
4) The theoretical position on integration (i.e. the
theoretical views on how the empirical and the
normative are related) should be made clear and
explicit (94% consensus)
The only reason this standard did not reach 100% con-
sensus was that one participant felt it could and should
be combined with standard 5. With respect to this
standard, the EB researcher should clarify his or her the-
oretical viewpoint on integration. This would require,
for example, an articulation of the meta-ethical and epis-
temological positions that allow normative knowledge
claims to be produced. For example, if one adopted a
hermaneutical/dialogical approach to integration, one
would need to provide (or refer to) an account of how
this approach enables us to make justified knowledge
claims about right and wrong based on articulation of
the justificatory power of dialogue and consensus.
The main point of contestation when this standard
was being discussed and formulated was a concern
about the extent to which these positions had to be jus-
tified and defended, or simply referred to clearly. The
consensus position very intentionally says ‘make clear
and explicit’ rather than ‘justify or defend’ because it was
felt, overall, that it would be unreasonably burdensome
to expect researchers to defend all meta-ethical and
epistemologial commitments and assumptions in every
paper. Rather, it was felt to be sufficient to make clear
what they are and provide appropriate citations accord-
ing to standard academic convention.
5) The method of integration should be explained and
justified, including details of what is integrated with
what, how and by whom (94% consensus)
The only reason this standard did not reach 100% con-
sensus was that one participant felt it could and should
be combined with standard 4. The primary reason it
seemed nonetheless appropriate to maintain a distinc-
tion between them is that standard 4 requires certain
positions and assumptions to be made clear. Standard 5,
however, requires clear articulation of the implications
of those positions in the context of this specific project,
and explanation of how the combination of meta-ethics,
epistemology and method form a methodology capable
of meeting the project’s stated aims. As such, standard 5
operates at a higher level of specificity than standard 4,
and requires justification as opposed to mere articula-
tion. This seems appropriate, because whilst it is argu-
ably unreasonable to require a researcher to fully justify
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a longstanding meta-ethical and/or epistemological pos-
ition in order to present their research, it seems none-
theless essential that the researcher explains how that
position has an impact on their methodology for a spe-
cific project and therefore affects the knowledge claims
that are produced, and why the decisions made are justi-
fied given the aims of the research.
6) There should be transparency, consistency and rigor
in the execution and reporting of the integrating
analysis (100% consensus)
This standard requires a transparent description of the
analytic process that leads to the normative conclu-
sion(s) – essentially a narrative that makes clear the
process of reasoning that led to these specific normative
conclusions being drawn. Meeting this standard requires
a further level of specificity as it asks the researcher to
articulate clearly how the methodology was applied to
create a reasoning process that can be followed and
understood.
It is important to note that during discussions about
all three of the integration standards, some participants
repeatedly pointed towards the fact that the term ‘inte-
gration’ seems to presuppose a clear distinction between
‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ (or prescriptive) compo-
nents of ethics research, such that processes through
which they are combined (integrated) are required.
These participants wanted to remind us that some prac-
titioners of EB research do not accept this distinction.
They were, however, generally willing to support these
standards of integration, and this seems justifiable given
that one way to meet standard 4 would be to articulate a
meta-ethical/epistemological position that either makes
integration unnecessary or provides an alternative
account of the relationship between facts and values.
Domain 4 – Conduct of empirical work
7) Empirical bioethics research ought to attend to the
rigorous implementation of empirical methods, and
import accepted standards of conduct from
appropriate research paradigms (94% consensus)
This standard reflects and attends to concerns raised,
for example by Hurst [3], that some EB work uses
methods and approaches from discrete disciplines but
does not apply the standards of rigour that those disci-
plines require. It stands to reason that if one is import-
ing a method of either empirical or conceptual analysis,
and relying on it to inform some part of the research
process, then one cannot use interdisciplinary as an
excuse for poor execution of that method. One issue
that arises with this standard is the need to distinguish
between conduct and reporting. It is a well-known prob-
lem for interdisciplinary researchers that even assuming
all aspects of the research were conducted according to
this standard, when it comes to reporting the work there
is often insufficient space to demonstrate and report that
rigor in full. As such, one may end up focusing on dem-
onstrating rigor in one aspect of the work (dictated by
the disciplinary focus of the target journal) at the
expense of another. The point here is that whilst this
standard is easy to formulate, and relatively straightfor-
ward to implement, we recognize that it is challenging
to demonstrate and report this rigor given current publi-
cation norms.
8) Empirical bioethics research should, if and where
necessary, develop and amend empirical methods to
facilitate collection of the data required to meet the
aims of the research; but deviation from accepted
disciplinary standards and practices ought to be
acknowledged and justified (94% consensus)
This standard functions to signal, and acknowledge,
the often necessary innovation and adaptation required
in EB. Empirical methods that are borrowed from estab-
lished disciplines may not be entirely fit for purpose, and
may need developing to enable a specific project to meet
its aims. One good example of this is making qualitative
research encounters more interrogative, with the
researcher challenging the participant and offering coun-
terfactual cases to explore the values that might lie
behind an ethical stance articulated by the participant in
an interview. This statement is important to consider in
combination with standard 7. Whilst methods must be
executed with appropriate disciplinary rigor, when a
method is not fit for purpose in a specific research pro-
ject it is necessary to amend it – but such amendment
must be acknowledged and justified.
9) Empirical bioethics research should reflect on and
justify the appropriateness and fit of the chosen
empirical methods in relation to (a) the normative
aims (b) the stated approach to integration (100%
consensus)
This standard refers to the requirement to harmonize
the empirical methods used with the aims of the re-
search, the process of integration and the analysis – and
it is implicit that this includes the moral epistemology
adopted. This is perhaps one of the most difficult things
to grasp for empirical bioethics researchers. The fact
that different approaches to empirical research are
founded upon different epistemological commitments is
something to which some philosophical approaches to
empirical bioethics have failed to be attentive [27, 28].
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To not recognize this, and to not harmonize all stages of
the research, is to fail to see the research process as a
coherent whole and rather views it as a patchwork
where different methods and epistemologies can be
swapped in and out unproblematically. For example, if
one intends to draw generalizable normative conclusions
through the combination of empirical and ethical ana-
lysis, one need to consider whether, and why, one might
need to use empirical research methods that are compat-
ible with making generalizable knowledge claims.
10) Empirical bioethics research should consider and
reflect on the implicit ethical and epistemological
assumptions of the chosen empirical method (94%
consensus)
This standard is a pre-requisite for being able to
meet standard 9, and refers to the requirement to be
aware of the fact that empirical methods themselves
are not value free tools that are capable of producing
objective empirical knowledge claims (see also Singh,
2017). Different empirical methods prioritize different
kinds of knowledge production, for example; focus
groups are designed to capture a group view;
in-depth interviews are designed to capture personal
accounts; large population surveys are designed to
generate generalizable knowledge claims about a
population. Given this, choosing a particular empirical
method signals a prioritization of certain kinds of
knowledge claim in terms of both (a) what kind of
empirical knowledge is most valuable and (b) what
kind of knowledge claim is most appropriate to meet
the aims of the project. Bearing in mind that the
chosen methods will tend to place limits or expecta-
tions on, for example: the number of people that can
be included as participants; the extent to which indi-
vidual voices are listened to; or the kinds of people
who can participate, the choice of empirical method
signals who and what is important to the researcher,
and why. It is important, therefore, to be able to con-
sider to what extent the implications of choices made
about the empirical method are compatible with the
normative aims of the research.
Domain 5 – Conduct of normative work
11) In empirical bioethics research there should be
thorough delineation of the ethical issue(s), paying
attention to, and locating them within, the relevant
disciplinary literature (94% consensus)
This standard reflects the view that regardless of
how the normative analysis is undertaken, EB work
must make clear the ethical issues it is concerned
with and take pains to locate those issues within the
existing literature. This is important, given that it is
possible to identify some (putatively) EB work that ei-
ther (a) takes for granted and assumes what the eth-
ical issues are, or (b) fails to acknowledge that much
‘mono-disciplinary’ work on the normative issues may
have already been conducted (or assumes that work is
no longer relevant now that empirical work has been
or is being done). This formulation allows for work
that begins from a position of having identified the
ethical issues, or that seeks to discover them along
the way. What it does is state that, at some point ap-
propriate to the precise research process being used:
(a) the ethical issues the work is concerned with must
be clearly articulated; (b) an explanation must be pro-
vided about why they are ethical issues, and; (c) there
must be engagement with relevant disciplinary litera-
ture that has dealt with the same or relevantly similar
issues.
12) In empirical bioethics research there should be
explicit and robust normative analysis. ‘Normative
analysis’ includes attempts to justify position X to
person Y with the use of ethical reasoning, providing
suggestion for improvement to position X based on
ethical reasoning, or attempts to break down and
make explicit a complex normative issue in order to
gain a better understanding of it (81% consensus)
This standard was the most controversial amongst the
group, and only reached consensus after re-formulation
and then only at 81% (the lowest possible). This was also
the most controversial standard at the meeting itself,
taking up in excess of 90 min of the round 5 discussion.
The initial framing was considered too narrow in its use
and definition of the term ‘ethical argument’, and discus-
sion focused on ways of making the standard less re-
strictive in terms of the normative work it supported.
The main issues are captured well in the following com-
ment offered during round 6a:
“Ethical arguments” is too narrow to capture other
methods that classify [sic] as “normative analysis”.
Furthermore, I do not see how this broader term
“normative analysis” would open the door for an
inflationary broadening that risks losing the genuine
normative elements that we would like to see in our
definition of empirical bioethics. I would therefore
prefer the broader term “normative analysis”.
In the reformulation, the term ‘normative analysis’ was
adopted, and examples provided that encompass differ-
ent kinds of normative work that do not focus on ethical
argument that attempts to convince others of the
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argument’s conclusion, but also includes (a) normative
work that develops new insights that could broaden
one’s moral horizon (stimulating reflection and dia-
logue, and presented as questions for investigation ra-
ther than arguments intended to convince), or (b)
elucidating ethical problems by showing that currently
accepted ways of resolving them do not do justice to
all relevant aspects of the problem.
This standard remains, perhaps, the most controver-
sial. Some participants felt that any attempt to pro-
vide insight, elucidate or make suggestions must
include at least an implicit attempt to convince the
reader that such claims ought to be taken seriously,
and in doing that one is necessarily making an argu-
ment that one’s own point of view ought to be
accepted. Further, it might be claimed that if no such
attempt is being made, there is nothing normative
about the work and it is therefore merely describing
possible positions and options. Conversely, others felt
that ‘normative analysis’ can aim to provide insight
into an ethical problem by showing various possible
issues and perspectives, stimulating a broadening of
one’s moral horizon – without engaging in argument
of any kind. The normative claim in such work would
be that these broader perspectives should be taken
into account, without providing an argument as to
why one of them would be the best (which would
contradict the aim of opening up new ways of envis-
aging a moral problem). The putative difference
between normative argument and normative analysis
is, therefore, that the former attempts to convince an
interlocutor to adopt a specific position, whereas the
latter can offer a range of options and perspectives
that can broaden existing positions and arguments -
thus providing a basis for further argument - without
claiming to provide a decisive conclusion.
Some participants felt strongly that the term ‘argu-
ment’ excluded anything that was not an attempt to
convince, whereas the term ‘analysis’ includes both at-
tempts to convince and other kinds of normative
work. Other participants felt just as strongly that un-
less there was some attempt to convince – to make a
‘should’ or an ‘ought’ claim, there is nothing norma-
tive going on, and additionally that any attempt to ar-
ticulate perspectives that decision makers ‘should’
take into account must be making an argument that
people should act in certain way.
Overall, however, the consensus group felt that the
entire spectrum of normative work ought to be
accommodated, and that the language of ‘analysis’
was more unproblematically inclusive than the lan-
guage of ‘argument’. Even so, this was still the stand-
ard with the lowest level of consensus, and it
remains at issue.
Domain 6 – Training and expertise
13) The empirical bioethics researcher, or the research
team as a whole, should possess competence in
ethical inquiry, empirical inquiry and methods of
integration (100% consensus)
In line with the previous domains and standards,
this standard requires that core competences for con-
ducting EB research must be possessed by, or access-
ible to, the conducting researcher or research team.
While in recent years many researchers have acquired
competency in normative and empirical disciplines, as
well as the competence to integrate normative and
empirical analyses, there was acknowledgement that
in many, if not most, cases the necessary compe-
tences will need to be contributed by different re-
searchers. However it is provided or accessed, it was
considered essential by all that such competencies are
present in the research team.
14) The empirical bioethics researcher(s) should have at
least a basic knowledge of bioethics, and an
understanding of whatever aspects of other
disciplines or fields that are engaged with (88%
consensus)
On one hand, this standard emphasizes that in EB
knowledge in bioethics is the central prerequisite for any
competent research. On the other hand, the standard ac-
knowledges that knowledge and/or skills related to other
normative or empirical disciplines are important for EB
research. The relatively low figure for consensus on this
standard, compared to the 100% consensus reached for
standard 13, may be explained by the discussion about
what participants understand by “basic knowledge of
bioethics” given the breadth of the field. For example,
the group recognized they could not have agreed on a
minimal set of theories, concepts or topics which com-
prise a threshold of basic bioethics knowledge - and in
the absence of this a standard might seem quite empty.
Additionally, the phrase “understanding of whatever
aspects of other disciplines or fields” had to be formu-
lated in very broad terms so it would cover the broad
range of knowledge, methods and skills that might be
needed for a specific project. The formulation of this
standard attempts to make clear that, whatever one is
doing, one ought to consider whether, and be able to
show that, one has sufficient understanding and basic
knowledge to do it.
15) Provision should be made for ensuring that any
team members can acquire or enhance competence
in empirical bioethics research (93% consensus)
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This standard is clearly connected to standards 13 and
14, but is differentiated by the fact that it requires not
only that those competences are delivered as part of an
EB research project, but also that those participating in
the respective research can acquire the relevant know-
ledge and skills during the project. While this standard,
and the others in this domain, may not be relevant in
evaluating the EB research paper for publication, they
are highly relevant for the evaluation of EB research pro-
posals involving junior researchers from different disci-
plines who wish to become competent EB researchers.
Final remarks
Having outlined the 15 standards for EB research on
which we were able to reach consensus, it is important
to consider how they should be implemented and under-
stood. There are a few points we would like to make in
relation to this.
First, it is clear that these standards cover a range of
research phases, and not all of the standards will or
should be applicable to each phase. The most basic dis-
tinctions to make are between identifying and designing
an EB project, planning, carrying out the project, and
reporting it. To make clear to which research phases we
anticipate these standards applying, we present Table 6,
which indicates the standard, the research phase, and
how we see the standard applying to that phase.
Second, in outlining standards of practice we are
making an explicit normative point about what a cer-
tain kind of work should look like, and must there-
fore consider the implications for a piece of work
that does not meet them. In setting out standards of
practice we are outlining criteria that might be used
to both identify research as EB research and appraise
the quality of EB research. The majority of the stan-
dards we have articulated, however, are formal rather
than contently – meaning that they set out require-
ments for features of the research process that need
to be attended to rather than stipulating a priori how
they ought to be attended to. In this sense, these
standards can be understood as minimal criteria,
similar to those seen in the literature on quality
appraisal of qualitative research [29, 30], which out-
line what researchers need to do in order to demon-
strate they are giving consideration to key features of
the research process and enable a judgement to be
made about its quality. What they cannot do is stipu-
late, a priori, whether the decisions made in relation
to these features of research, or the discussion of
them that is provided, is good quality. That remains a
matter of judgement.
The exceptions to this are standards 1 and 2, which,
as Table 6 shows, we see as standards that will deter-
mine whether a particular piece of research is the
kind of research to which the rest of the standards
ought to apply. These standards do make contently
claims, but this seems essential given what they aim
to do.
It is, of course, important to consider this point along-
side the limitations (discussed above) imposed by a
process that included only a limited group of European
researchers. The consensus on standards 1 and 2 in par-
ticular may well be a product of a particularly European
perspective, and is certainly a product of the particular
group of individuals who took part.
Similarly, further discussion and debate may be needed
to consider whether we were correct to focus our con-
sensus on a framing of empirical bioethics that is limited
to the integration of social scientific and ethical analysis.
Alternative perspectives might want to include the inte-
gration of data from the life sciences, and this would be
legitimate enterprise. Although this has not featured
significantly in the literature to date, one notable excep-
tion is a recent paper by Mertz and Schildmann [31],
who have suggested that the methodological challenges
therein may not be dissimilar to those encountered
when we focus on social scientific data.
We appreciate that our standards could lead to some
research practices being excluded as EB, and others be-
ing included when those who pursue it might not want
them to be. We hope that this exercise is not perceived
as an attempt to draw boundaries, but rather as an
attempt by a developing community of practice [22] to
say ‘if we want to engage in this kind of research prac-
tice, which has these kinds of aims, these are the stan-
dards to which we agree we should hold ourselves’. The
act of labelling this research practice ‘Empirical Bioeth-
ics’ might be interpreted as a territorial act and an
appropriation of the term. We see it, rather, as a neces-
sary step in achieving clarity. Whilst others are free to
disagree with what we have done, this exercise will help
to clarify precisely what they are disagreeing with. A
useful exercise that might be undertaken next is to
gather examples of EB research that either demonstrate
adherence to, or challenge, the standards outlined here;
focusing on examples that illustrate good practice
according to, or in spite of not adhering to, these
standards.
That said, we can also view this consensus statement
as a step towards fully engaging the wider community of
EB researchers in a discussion that needs to continue.
Through articulating these standards we outline a pos-
ition on empirical bioethics that encourages responses,
and through those responses we will be able to identify
points of agreement and contestation that will drive the
conversation forward. In that vein, we would encourage
researchers, funders and journals to engage with what
we have proposed, and respond to us, so that our
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community of practice of EB research can develop and
evolve further.
Endnotes
1Ontological questions are, broadly speaking, ques-
tions about the nature of substance and reality. Moral
ontology is the study of the nature and substance of
morality (e.g. are moral values objectively real and inde-
pendent of the person making the judgement?).
2Epistemological questions are, broadly speaking,
questions about the nature of knowledge. Moral epis-
temology is the study of the nature of moral knowledge
(e, g, how can we obtain knowledge about what is right
and wrong).
3A meta-ethical position is, broadly speaking; a set of
beliefs or commitments about the nature of moral
claims and how one can have knowledge about right and
wrong.
4It was noted during the writing up stage that this
framing of ‘ethical arguments’ seems at odds with the
framing of ‘ethical analysis’ articulated, and much
debated, in standard 12 (below). Whilst it is important,
for the integrity of the consensus process, to maintain
the wording of this standard that was agreed, it may be
reasonable to assume a wider reading of ‘ethical argu-
ment’ here that is consistent with the use of ‘normative
analysis’ in standard 12.
5Participants acknowledged that ‘empirical data’ can
mean different things. For example, biological parame-
ters related to experiencing pain, answers to question-
naires on normative attitudes towards a particular issue,
but also dialogue with stakeholders in the practice under
study. We did, however, focus on the use of social scien-
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